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Philosophy and T heology
A spate of recent articles defends the permissibility and practice of killing 
newborns. In their Hastings Center Report article “Ending the Life of a Newborn: 
The Groningen Protocol” (January-February 2008), Hilde Lindemann and Marian 
Verkerk support those who “responsibly end the lives of severely impaired new­
borns” of various kinds suffering from serious illness.1 Their argument is fairly 
straightforward and similar in form to the argument in favor of euthanasia generally, 
another practice accepted in the Netherlands. They note that most people already 
sanction the removal of life support from severely handicapped babies who have no 
chance of survival (these are “Group 1” babies). “Group 2 consists of infants who 
‘may survive after a period of intensive treatment, but expectations regarding their 
future condition are very grim.' They include infants with severe brain abnormalities 
or extensive organ damage caused by lack of oxygen. The dilemma here is whether 
these infants are so badly off that they should be allowed to die.”
In the United States and Europe, there is a consensus that it is permissible to 
withdraw or withhold treatment from such children, allowing them to die. “In the 
Netherlands, however, if neither withholding nor withdrawing intensive treatment 
will result in a speedy death, the unbearable suffering of the infant is seen as a com­
pelling reason for the doctor to end its life directly.” Group 3 consists of
infants who are not and have not been dependent on intensive medical treatment 
and who, with proper care, can in some cases survive many years, even into 
adulthood. They have serious conditions that cannot be treated but cause terrible 
suffering, such as epidermolysis bullosa, which in severe cases produces large, 
painful, fluid-filled blisters and continual scarring that fuses the fingers and
1 Hilde Lindemann and Marian Verkerk, “Ending the Life of a Newborn: The Groningen 
Protocol,” Hastings Center Report 38:1 (January-February 2008): 42-51.
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toes and leads to feeding and swallowing difficulties. Other severe conditions
include progressive paralysis, complete lifelong dependency, and permanent
inability to communicate in any way.
The Groningen Protocol applies to babies in all three groups, allowing for intentional 
killing of newborns contingent upon informed consent given by both parents, a 
certain diagnosis of “hopeless and unbearable suffering” confirmed by at least one 
independent doctor, and also the consent of the physician who will kill the baby. From 
Lindemann and Verkerk’s perspective, babies in Group 3 have the most pressing need 
to be killed, since they could survive into adulthood with their terrible conditions.
Lindemann and Verkerk defend the Groningen Protocol for killing newborns, 
which they argue has been misunderstood by errors in linguistic translation as well as 
cultural misunderstandings of the Dutch context. At times, their defense of infanticide 
seems to rest on a moral relativism wherein infanticide is permissible in Holland, but 
perhaps not elsewhere. Moral relativism is typically not presupposed in discussions 
of infanticide, since relativism opens the door to approval of sex selection abortion 
and infanticide of baby girls as practiced in some parts of the world.2 However, even 
aside from presupposing relativism, the real problems with Lindemann and Verkerk’s 
defense are foundational; they are not simply a matter of clarifying, for instance, 
that many babies, not only babies with spina bifida, will be subject to the protocol. 
For example, Lindemann and Verkerk presuppose the permissibility of physician-as­
sisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia. They take for granted that severe suffering, 
understood as physical pain or psychological agony, renders worthless the life of the 
one who suffers. If one rejects a self-body dualism,3 their reasoning necessitates the 
conclusion that suffering makes a human person worthless. If, however, all human 
persons have intrinsic value, and a person’s life is simply nothing other than the per­
son in his or her bodily dimension, then all human lives, even of those who severely 
suffer, have intrinsic value. To cite one more problematic assumption, the authors 
repeatedly offer a false dichotomy: either allow the baby to suffer or intentionally kill 
the infant. No mention is made of a third alternative: making use of drugs to relieve 
suffering, even if the dosage must be high enough to induce deep sleep.
At one point, the authors recognize a significant objection to their defense of 
infanticide: “It is of course true that some of these babies—those, for example, who 
face complete lifelong dependency—might, if kept alive, judge as adults that their 
lives had been worth something to them. Much would depend, one supposes, on 
how much pain and other kinds of suffering they had to endure to get to adulthood. 
But that consideration is no reason to proscribe all life-ending interventions on the 
basis of future suffering.” Why not? Empirical evidence shows that the overwhelm-
2 See Renuka M. Sharma, “The Ethics of Birth and Death: Gender Infanticide in India,” 
Journal o f  Bioethical Inquiry 4.3 (December 2007): 181-192, and Vardit Rispler-Chaim, 
“Contemporary Muftis between Bioethics and Social Reality: Selection of the Sex of a Fetus 
as Paradigm,” Journal o f Religious Ethics 36.1 (March 2008): 53-76.
3 Such dualism is also reflected in Omar Sultan Haque, “Brain Death and Its Entangle­
ments: A Redefinition of Personhood for Islamic Ethics,” Journal o f  Religious Ethics 36.1 
(March 2008): 19, 22.
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ing majority of adults suffering from serious illness do not kill themselves. These 
people have presumably known good health at some point in their lives, and so they 
suffer additionally (as children from Group 3 would not) in missing what they have 
lost. We have good reason to suppose that children from Group 3 would, as adults, 
value their lives, a consideration that should not be simply dismissed.
Lindemann and Verkerk falsely assume that the withdrawal or withholding 
of life support for an uncomprehending patient of any age depends on a judgment 
that the patient’s life is no longer of value. If the burdens of a treatment outweigh its 
benefits, then the treatment need not be administered or may be withdrawn. Of course 
the patient’s condition will partially determine the degree to which any given treat­
ment is beneficial and burdensome.4 The appropriate question, however, is whether 
a given treatment is more beneficial than burdensome, not whether a person’s life is 
beneficial or burdensome (lebensunwertes Leben, “life unworthy of life”).
Not limiting themselves to disabled newborns, Nicole Hassoun and Uriah Krie- 
gel offer a different defense of killing infants in their article, “Consciousness and the 
Moral Permissibility of Infanticide” (Journal o f Applied Philosophy, February 2008). 
Their argument in bare outline is as follows: “It is impermissible to intentionally 
kill a creature only if the creature is conscious; it is reasonable to believe that there 
is some time at which human infants are not conscious; therefore, it is reasonable to 
believe that it is permissible to intentionally kill some human infants.” The logic of 
their premises actually entails no limitation to only “some” infants.
In arguing for this conclusion, Hassoun and Kriegel make frequent appeal to 
authority: “At least since the work of Mary Ann Warren [1970s], it has been custom­
ary to hold that all and only those creatures it is impermissible to intentionally kill 
qualify as persons . . . Most philosophers will agree that consciousness is necessary 
for personhood, and in any case, this is where we shall begin.”
Taken literally, the proposition that consciousness is necessary for personhood is 
ridiculous. No one believes it is permissible to kill human beings in surgery, knocked 
out in a boxing match, or rendered unconscious by car accident, and yet in all these 
cases the human beings in question lack consciousness.
This difficulty could be remedied by speaking of being capable of consciousness 
rather than being actually conscious. Hausoun and Kriegal state that “T is creature­
conscious only if T is capable of having mental states that are state-conscious.” Could 
“capable” mean the ability to exercise this power in the future? The trouble with this 
modification, from the perspective of a person seeking to justify infanticide, is that 
the vast majority of infants are capable of consciousness in this sense.
In order to exclude the importance of potentiality, Hassoun and Kriegel appeal 
to the following example: “Consider, however, what we would say if we found out 
that oysters could be made conscious upon being transported to Mars. This would
4 Christopher Kaczor, “The Culture of Life and the Quality of Life Ethic: An Either/ 
Or?” in Culture o f  Life— Culture o f  Death, ed. Luke Gormally (London: Linacre Center, 
2002), 313-321.
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probably not convince most of us to stop eating oysters on Earth.” Of course, a normal 
human infant develops toward consciousness in the absence of special intervention, 
unlike the oysters transported to Mars, so Hassoun and Kriegel develop their example 
further. “Suppose that many years from now, a space elevator is installed between 
Earth and Mars, and that an oyster finds its way to the elevator. At this point, the nor­
mal course of events should lead to that oyster’s becoming conscious in the absence 
o f intervention. The oyster on the elevator is thus potentially conscious in the sense 
in which foetuses and neonates are—it is, so to speak, en route to consciousness. 
Yet it still seems intuitively permissible to kill the oyster.”
It is difficult to take such a preposterous example seriously rather than laugh 
and say, “Come on, do you really think that killing a newborn baby is like killing 
an oyster that could become conscious by taking a space elevator to Mars?” The 
more ridiculous the example, the less useful it is in clarifying real cases at hand. 
However, ifper impossible oysters were indeed rational creatures simply in need of 
the right developmental conditions in order to flourish, then they would have rights 
to live. But they are not, so they do not.
At what stage of development do Hassoun and Kriegel believe that human 
beings begin to have a right to live? Although some claim evidence of self-aware­
ness only twelve to fourteen days after birth, Hassoun and Kriegel also offer what 
they take to be another plausible cutoff point for infanticide: “It is quite plausible 
to take mirror self-recognition to be evidence for  the presence of self-awareness. 
The question we want to ask ourselves is at what age humans develop the ability for 
mirror self-recognition. The evidence suggests that humans develop the capacity 
for mirror self-recognition between the ages of eighteen months and twenty-four 
months.” When killing children up to two years of age becomes a matter of debate, 
one wonders whether Elizabeth Anscombe was right that certain positions reveal a 
corrupt mind with which argument is not profitable.5
Recalling Anscombe’s remarks and rejecting them, at least as applicable to kill­
ing newborns, Jeff McMahan’s “Infanticide” (Utilitas, June 2007) offers argument in 
favour of intentionally killing infants after birth in order to transplant their organs. 
The scenario he envisions, which he names “Healthy Newborn,” is as follows:
A woman dies in childbirth leaving a very premature but healthy infant, just a 
few hours old. The child’s biological father died months ago and neither he nor 
the mother had any living relatives. Both were reclusive and had no friends; hence 
there is no one who is specially related, even indirectly, to the infant. Suppose 
there are four children in the same hospital, all of whom are three years old and 
need an organ transplant within the next twenty-four hours in order to survive. 
Because these children’s organs have been impaired by illness, it is not possible 
to wait for one to die and use his or her organs to save the others; nor is it possible 
to sacrifice one (say, by lottery) to save the other three. But the newborn infant 
has the right tissue type and its organs could be used to save all four.




Most people, including those who defend abortion, are horrified by this scenario. 
McMahan’s work is especially interesting because it shows an inconsistency in 
defenses of abortion that seek to exclude infanticide but secure the permissibility of 
abortion throughout pregnancy.
McMahan notes that many defenders of abortion believe it would be morally 
permissible for a woman to have an abortion after viability if it is in the interest of 
her health to do so, a scenario he calls “Selfish Abortion.” He points out that there 
is no difference in intrinsic properties, and therefore no difference in moral status, 
between a newborn baby and a viable human fetus. “The reason why there cannot be 
intrinsic differences between newborn infants generally and viable fetuses is simply 
that viable fetuses could be newborn infants if they were delivered prematurely.” 
Indeed, an infant born prematurely at six months is less well developed than a child 
in utero at nine months. Since McMahan also rightly supposes that birth itself is 
irrelevant to the moral status of the progeny, a viable fetus and an infant have equal 
moral standing. Therefore, if it is permissible for a person to intentionally kill the 
viable fetus in order to eliminate health problems for one person, “Selfish Abortion,” 
then it would seem to be morally licit to intentionally kill a viable fetus in order to 
harvest its organs to save the lives of four children in need of organ transplantation, 
a grisly scenario McMahan calls, “Altruistic Abortion.” But if “Altruistic Abortion” 
is permissible, since the viable fetus and the newborn infant have the same moral 
status, then it should also be permissible to kill a newborn in order to harvest his or her 
organs to save the lives of four other children, the “Healthy Newborn” scenario.
McMahan also seeks to show that the pro-life position is mistaken. Why would 
it be permissible to kill an animal in order to make use of its organs but impermissible 
to kill a viable fetus? McMahan explores a number of possible responses.
One pro-life argument is that a viable fetus, but not a nonrational animal, has 
the potential to develop cognitive capacities and that this difference makes abortion 
for organ retrieval wrong but killing an animal for the same reason permissible. 
McMahan rebuts this suggestion by noting a congenitally severely retarded human 
fetus would not have the capacity for rationality, arguing that species membership 
is morally irrelevant.
However, moral decisions bear on promoting or thwarting the flourishing of 
others. Species membership is morally relevant because it gives us a benchmark by 
which to judge the flourishing of an individual member of a species.6 For example, 
for a human being of a certain age to be unable to read indicates a failure of that 
individual to fully flourish; whereas a squirrel can flourish qua squirrel without 
reading, and so even if per impossible we could teach a squirrel to read, we would 
be under no obligation to do so. Since there are species-specific kinds of flourishing,
6 See Elizabeth Anderson, “Animal Rights and the Values of Nonhuman Life,” and 
Martha Nussbaum, “Beyond Compassion and Humanity: Just for Non-human Animals,” 
in Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions, ed. Cass R. Sunstein and Martha 
Nussbaum (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
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the natural kind of a being matters ethically. Precisely an account of species-specific 
flourishing allows us to identify and bemoan human retardation as a painful lack of 
flourishing. It is in virtue of an account of species-specific flourishing that we take 
it as a serious loss for them and the human community that mentally handicapped 
human beings cannot fully flourish as the kinds of beings that they are. A mentally 
retarded human being and a dog may be equally incapable of exercising distinctly 
human reasoning and freedom, but the handicap of the human is tragic while the 
rational incapacity a dog is inconsequential. This difference rests on the fact that the 
human, but not the dog, cannot exercise his or her species-specific form of flourishing. 
Since even mentally handicapped human beings share in a species-specific form of 
flourishing ordered to the goods of rationality and freedom, they are human persons 
even though they are not flourishing human persons.
McMahan’s second argument against membership in the human species as 
a source of moral status is based on human and nonhuman combinations across 
the transgenic spectrum: “Individuals at one end of the spectrum with only a tiny 
proportion of human genes are unambiguously chimpanzees; those at the other end 
with only a tiny proportion of chimpanzee genes are unambiguously human beings. 
The relevant question is whether the moral status of any individual in the spectrum 
depends on whether it has a sufficiently high proportion of human genes to count 
as a member of the human species.” Given the Transgenic Spectrum example, Mc­
Mahan believes the defender of human life is faced with a dilemma following from 
the disjunction that either being a member of the species Homo sapiens is a matter 
of degree or it is not.
One horn of the dilemma follows from the assumption that being a human is 
not a matter of degree but rather is an all or nothing category. It is hard to believe 
that a being mostly composed of chimp genes, but who had the brain of a human 
being would not be deserving of our respect. Likewise, a being composed mostly 
of human genes but with a chimp brain would not seem to be worthy of respect as 
human. Rational functioning rather than the proportion of human genes determines 
moral status.
On the other hand, if being a human is a matter of degree, reasons McMahan, 
then defenders of life cannot claim that all persons have an equal right to life (the equal 
wrongness thesis), since all transgenic creatures would not be equally human.
At work here is a presupposition that we need not accept. “Assume that our 
working genealogical criterion of species membership is undergirded by a deeper 
genetic criterion—in other words, that membership in the human species is deter­
mined by the possession of a characteristically human genome, which is in fact 
produced only by the fusion of gametes from human parents.” If we retain the Bo- 
ethian definition of person as an individual substance of rational nature, then we can 
sidestep McMahan’s argument. If creatures of mixed origin are manufactured, then 
we shall have to debate about whether they should be included in the category of 
rational animals. But the debate about such creations need not undermine the moral 
conviction that all human beings—anyone who arises from human parents—should 
be protected by law and welcomed in life. Indeed, if a species of animal is manu­
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factured with a mix of human and nonhuman genes (itself morally problematic),7 
then the species would have moral rights if the species had a rational nature. We 
would know the nature of the beings in question by observing how healthy, mature 
members of the species function.
Until we had moral clarity about the nature oftrangenetic beings, we should treat 
such creatures as if they had moral rights on the supposition that we should err on the 
side of protecting what very well may turn out to be animals of a rational nature. We 
already know that all human beings are members of a rational species, so all human 
beings merit respect as persons, including all newly born human beings.
Ch r i s t o p h e r  Ka c z o r , Ph .D.
Loyola Marymount University 
Los Angeles, California
7 National Academies, Guidelines for Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research (Wash­
ington, DC: National Academies Press, 2005), 55.
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